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implemented through an assessment per cwt of milk marketed. The assessment which, at its peak, was $0.50 per cwt was extremely unpopular.
# To assure that the Milk Price Support Program was not effectively undergirding the price of milk throughout the world, import quotas were established by a combination of legislation (Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933) and executive orders.
The combination of the Uruguay Round trade agreement and the 1996 Farm Bill radically changed U.S. dairy policy in the following ways (Economic Research Service):
# Import quotas were reduced consistent with the Uruguay Round requirements. In contrast with Canada, the U.S. dairy industry received little or no special considerationperhaps because the U.S. dairy farmer lobby has been in political disarray.
# The price support program is scheduled to be completely eliminated on December 31, 1999 . This was the price U.S. dairy farmers paid for eliminating the assessment. Section 22 import quotas were replaced by tariff rate quotas agreed to under the WTO provisions resulting from the Uruguay Round. Substituting for the Price Support Program is a Recourse Loan Program which will allow manufactured product processors to obtain government loans using manufactured dairy products in storage as collateral. Since a recourse loan is no different than a private sector inventory loan, it will have no price supporting virtues. Therefore, on January 1, 2000, the only source of price support protection will be the tariff rate quota operating on manufactured products. Most likely, the volume level at which the tariff is imposed will be increased by the next round of trade negotiations, moving the U.S. dairy industry further in the direction of free trade in dairy products.
# Reform of the FMMO system was mandated. The only dimension of this reform process that is known at this time is that the number of orders will be reduced from 38 to 14 or less. The most recent USDA proposal is for 11 orders. The Secretary of Agriculture has also indicated that a substitute must be found for the M-W price series. A manufactured product based formula, a component pricing procedure, a Grade A competitive price series, and a Four Class combination of component pricing cheese and a product formula for butter and nonfat dry milk are under consideration. Product pricing proposals were poisoned by a controversial University of Wisconsin study indicating that the price of See Coffin, Flaten, Rosaasen and Proulx for an excellent description of the origin and 1 evolution of the Canadian supply management system. 4 cheese is monopolistically manipulated (Mueller, Marion, Sial and Geithman) -a conclusion that has been disputed (Gardner) . Also being considered is a modification of the Eau Claire based Class I price surface with options ranging from a flat price to various multiple basing point concepts.
The point to be derived from this summary is that U.S. dairy policy is being modernized and appears to be moving decisively in the direction of less government involvement in pricing.
Canadian Dairy Policy
Like the United States, Canadian dairy policy was affected by the Uruguay Round (Barichello and Romain) . However, the basics of supply management, which have been in existence since 1970, remain intact. The primary implementing agency is the Canadian Dairy 1 Commission, although provincial policy is more important in Canada than state policy is in the United States.
Prior to Uruguay Round-induced modifications, Canadian dairy policy included the following components:
# A national market sharing quota for milk used for manufacturing (industrial milk) was allocated among the provinces based on historical market shares. The industrial quota reflects estimated domestic requirements plus exports (a small percentage) at the established price. Until 1995, fluid milk quotas and pricing were determined at the provincial level. In most provinces, a public quota market has existed for both fluid and industrial milk and quotas are traded among producers. However, provincial limits generally have existed on the quantity of quota held by a producer.
# The established target price for industrial milk is set on the basis of the average cost of production as determined from survey data. This target price has been achieved by a combination of a support price for butter and nonfat dry milk (NDM) in conjunction with a direct federal subsidy which was $C 6.03/hl (approximately U.S. $2.20 per cwt) until 1992.
# Different classified pricing systems were practiced by the provinces.
# Surplus removal/price support and adequate fulfillment of seasonal market demand were achieved by a combination of processor sale to the Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC) and repurchased within the year, and by CDC purchases of butter and NDM.
Manufactured products not needed were exported at the world market price and producers paid the loss.
# Funding for CDC activities resulted from a combination of within-quota and over-quota levies on a per hl basis.
Subsequent to the Uruguay Round Agreement, the following changes were made in Canadian dairy policy, with an effective date of August 1995 except where otherwise indicated:
# All provinces accepted five milk classes. Because producer levies for export were not acceptable under the Uruguay Round, Class 5 was established as an export class. In order to share the cost of exporting among all producers, provinces agreed to pool milk revenues at the national level. Interestingly, a similar plan has been proposed for U.S.
FMMOs. However, the USDA has determined that such a plan would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of WTO policy. Some provinces have employed a classic two-price plan whereby producers are allowed to contract with processors for export, accepting the export price for milk.
# While a common quota exchange market policy has been agreed upon by six provinces, until now it has been implemented only between Quebec and Nova Scotia. Fear apparently exists of the potential for substantial interprovincial quota transfer -a fear that may be well-founded. However, most provincial limits on quantity of quota held or purchased by a producer appear to have been eliminated. # CDC price support purchases are limited to ensuring an adequate seasonal supply of milk products during deficit periods. When surpluses are anticipated, CDC contracts with processors for products suitable for export with the margin being negotiated. Milk used to process dairy products sold under this program is paid the Class 5 price.
Anticipated Policy Impacts
The key dairy policy difference between the United States and Canada involves the Canadian practice of supply management over the past 25 years. Concurrently, the CDC and its provincial 6 dairy board counterparts have administered/set prices. While the U.S. dairy policy, from time to time, has attempted to overtly bring production in line with consumption, through programs such as buying farmers out of production, price has been the primary means of adjusting production to market needs. Economic theory provides considerable insight into the expected impacts of these policy differences.
Profit Maximization. Consider a profit maximizing producer endowed with a given size of fixed equipment which can accommodate a maximum number of cows n*. In a competitive market, the problem can be expressed as:
where Π is profit, P is the price of milk, n is the number of cows, C(Y) is the variable cost function per cow (mainly feeding cost), W is the purchase price of a cow, and F is fixed cost. The for the producer is, of course, to produce where marginal cost equals marginal revenue for all cows and to use its fixed equipment (barn for example) to full capacity (n = n*).
Under a whole farm quota restriction, associated with high levies for over quota production, the profit maximizing problem is the following: 
Equation 5 implies an interesting result with respect to the optimal level of yield per cow that the profit maximizing producer would target. If n* is not binding, λ = 0 and equation 5 implies that the optimal level of production per cow is at the level where marginal cost equals average variable cost plus the purchase price of the cow per unit of production. This optimum yield per cow may be close to the point where average variable (feeding) cost is at its minimum, hence lower than the competitive market equilibrium. In fact, the above result merely says that under a quota system that is produced with independent production units (cows), the maximum profit when n* is not binding will be obtained by maximizing average profits from each production unit.
The quota of the farm is then fulfilled by buying the appropriate number of cows. If n* is reached before the quota is fulfilled, producers will then begin increasing yield per cow with extra feeding.
λ will become positive and reflect the shadow profit that could be earned with extra fixed facilities.
When n* is not binding, the comparative statics of the above results show that yield per cow is not affected by a variation in quota. At the optimum, a decrease in quota would imply a decrease in the number of cows (MY/MQ = 0 and Mn/MQ =1/Y). However, when n* is binding, the optimal solution is to first diminish yield per cow until n* is no longer effective (MY/MQ = 1/n and Mn/MQ = 0), and then decrease the number of cows if needed. If Canadian farmers maximize profits, the above results would suggest that producers can rationally choose to decrease yield per cow rather than the average farm size.
Size of Farm. With respect to farm size, both national and provincial regulations have contributed to discourage/reduce growth in farm size. At the national level, there was a limit on the federal subsidy per farm. Each farm would not receive the subsidy on milk produced over 18,000 kg of butterfat unless they had special permission. This legislation was abolished in 1996.
Until recently, in some provinces, other regulations were either reducing growth or fixing limits on farm size. The following regulations may have had a significant impact on the evolution in farm size in Quebec and Ontario, as will be shown in a forthcoming section. # In Ontario, at the beginning of the 1990s, no operations could have more than 3,000 liters per day of combined quota without permission of the Ontario Milk Marketing Board.
Permission for increasing farm size above 4,400 liters per day was likely to be refused, and it was definitely refused when increases in farm size above 5,000 liters per day were sought. This regulation was modified a few years ago with the current limit being 50,000 kg of butterfat per year. Permission must be obtained for each subsequent 25,000 kg of butterfat although permission is easily granted, according to Dairy Farmers of Ontario.
# Manitoba had a limit of 400 kg of butterfat per day until December 31, 1995. This limit does not appear to have been effectively enforced and no longer exists.
# Saskatchewan has a limit of 4,500 liters per day. However, farmers can request more quota and if the requesting party is determined to be a privately-owned family farm, the permission is always granted. A spokesperson for the Saskatchewan Milk Marketing Board indicated that several farmers were over the limit.
# Alberta has no quota limits.
# British Columbia has no quota limits.
Even without considering the provincial regulations mentioned above, economic theory suggests that increasing average farm size would be slowed under supply management. Over the years, levies on over-quota production were at a level high enough to discourage over-quota production completely. Therefore, farmers have to buy quota to increase production and the demand for quota originates from the following two sources:
# The demand to meet the increase in cow productivity from one year to the next, due to improved management practices as well as improved genetic quality of the herd, results in a shift in the production function.
# The demand for expansion of the herd (increase in size), which requires an extra set of fixed inputs (barn, land, etc.) .
Utilizing the model presented, these two types of demand would not lead producers to bid the same maximum price for quota. Note that µ in equations 1 and 2 is the maximum rental value for quota that one particular profit maximizing producer is willing to pay, and this translates into a maximum bidding price for quota on the market. Similarly, 8 in equations 2 and 3 is the marginal profit that would be earned with fixed facilities for one extra cow. Therefore, 8 is the maximum amount a producer is willing to invest to obtain these facilities. Now, consider a shift in the production function. This has a direct impact on the cost function. Therefore, at a given quota level, the maximum rental price for extra quota is increased by the total decrease in cost due to the shift in technology.
On the other hand, extra facilities to increase the maximum number of cows, n*, without a shift in technology, do not translate into a shift in the variable cost function. Keeping the quota level constant, comparative static analysis shows that the decrease in yield per cow is less than one when n* is increased (MY/Mn* = -1/n), which implies that the increase in the maximum rental price for extra quota is less than that due to the shift in technology. Moreover, fixed facilities would have to be bought and financed, which would dampen total profit as compared to the shift in technology. Therefore, a producer would be able to bid a higher price for extra quota when he enjoys a shift in technology than when the producer wants to increase the maximum number of cows, n*, unless significant economies of size occur (this case is not dealt with in this paper).
Considering that quota prices are determined at the provincial level where both types of demand for quota meet, only producers with lower cost functions will be able to afford buying quota for expansion. This fact alone would slow the average growth of farm size in the dairy sector.
Structural Characteristics
From a U.S. perspective, the most basic structural characteristic of the dairy industry has been the trend toward fewer but larger farms. The driving force in this trend has been economies of size. Some of the most extensive research on U.S. economies of size in dairying was undertaken by the Office of Technology Assessment. It demonstrated that, in the early 1980s, reductions in costs per unit were evident up to at least 1,300 cows and that the drops in costs were substantial up to 500 cows (U.S. Congress, p. 192).
The trend toward fewer but larger farms has been revealed in both the United States and Canada. From the early 1970s to the early 1990s, the number of dairy farms declined by 63 percent in the United States compared with 73 percent in Canada (Table 1) , 1976-1995. 12 Therefore, as suggested by economic theory, the Canadian output per cow is less than for the United States because, with the quota being binding and considering the extra cost of buying quota or the much reduced revenue from over quota production, the level of feeding is reduced to the point where the desired output per cow is realized. This output per cow could be expected to approximate the minimum feed costs.
Comparisons across provinces and with U.S. cross-border states are more revealing of competitive relationships than the average output per cow (Figure 2 ). Washington has an output per cow about 1,500 kg greater than British Columbia with the gap having widened over the 1976-1995 period. The New York output per cow is about 1,900 kg larger than Ontario while Vermont is about 1,700 kg higher. Once again, the gap appears to be widening between U.S. and
Canadian dairy farms. The binding nature of quota transfers, the cost of the quota, and the lower revenue from over quota milk not only results in lower milk output per cow (Figure 2 ), but also restrains the growth in size of farm ( Table 2 ). The consequences of the different policy environments are very apparent from these data.
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Representative Farm Analysis
In January 1997, data for two representative Quebec dairy farms were developed. Quebec producers provided data for a moderate and large dairy farm. The producers judged that 70 and 125 milk cows were representative of moderate and large farms in the province.
The Agricultural and Food Policy Center had previously developed representative dairy farms in Vermont and Central New York. Table 3 In terms of assets per cow, the Canadian farms are more highly capitalized than the U.S.
representative farms. The critical issue in determining how much more highly capitalized involves whether to include quota values. Quotas were originally given to farmers who were in dairying.
Most farms are transferred from father to son, which is illustrated by the moderate size panel where all panel members were relatively young sons or daughters of retired dairy farmers. In this case, the father foregoes most of the quota value to ensure that the successor generation will be set up in dairying. When the quota value is ignored, the moderate and large Quebec farms have assets per cow of $C 10,786 and $C 12,329, respectively. That compares to assets per cow on the Central New York and Vermont farms ranging from $C 6,612 to $C 10,379, respectively.
With quota fully valued, the moderate and large Quebec farms have assets per cow of $C 20,786
and $C 21,993 respectively. 
Simulation Results
To examine the economic outlook for these representative dairies, the data was used in a whole farm simulation model, FLIPSIM (Richardson and Nixon) . FLIPSIM simulates the annual activities of a farm using accounting equations, identities, and probability distributions. The financial performance of the farm is simulated over a planning horizon using agricultural sector and macroeconomic projections.
Price and economic projections were developed for the United States and Canada by FAPRI and Ag Canada, and are summarized in Table 4 for the period 1996-2002. For the U.S. and
Canadian dairy farms, the baselines suggest generally lower feed costs, particularly in the middle of the period. For the U.S., FAPRI projects lower milk prices throughout the period due to the combination of lower feed costs and the benefits of larger farm size leading to lower average costs of production. Canada, on the other hand, is projected to experience persistent increases in milk prices throughout the period.
The Quebec farms experience increasing gross receipts throughout the study period caused by steadily increasing milk prices and higher cattle prices. Total cash expenses decline due to falling feed prices that overwhelm higher inflation-driven costs for other purchased inputs. Cash Both the Canadian and U.S. dairy industries are being subjected to the increasing pressures of evolving global market forces. In this process of inevitable change, one would hope that the dairy economies of the two countries would be converging. These analyses instead indicate a divergence in several critical measures -output per cow, size of farm, costs of production and milk prices. This divergence appears to be a direct result of differences in policy. It suggests that once the policy of harmonization begins, substantial adjustments are likely to occur in both industries with the magnitude of adjustment being much greater on the Canadian side.
